When Politics Starts to Mirror High-Control Groups
We have all studied cults in hindsight. We know the names, the footage, the outcomes. Jonestown. Heaven’s Gate. NXIVM. Aum Shinrikyo. The Manson Family. We watch the documentaries and wonder how people did not see it. We ask how ordinary individuals ended up defending leaders, repeating slogans, rejecting outside reality checks, and accepting behavior they once would have rejected. That question usually comes with an assumption: if we were there, we would have recognized the warning signs.
But the warning signs are not always obvious in the moment. High-control influence works because it does not arrive announcing itself. It arrives as identity, belonging, moral urgency, and a story that makes fear feel like wisdom. It changes what counts as trustworthy information. It changes what people feel allowed to say out loud. It changes what doubt means. Many scholars avoid the label “cult” because it can mean different things in different contexts and is often used as an insult rather than a precise category (Barker, 2013). So this article uses a research-based lens focused on cultic dynamics, meaning specific, studied patterns that show up in documented high-control groups, regardless of ideology.
This is the lens we used for the WATCH carousel. We are applying the same patterns here to show how high-control influence can appear in politics, and why so many people are asking whether MAGA is operating with similar mechanisms. This is not “all Republicans are MAGA,” and it is not a diagnosis of individuals. It is a pattern analysis. When multiple patterns appear together, the movement begins to behave less like normal political disagreement and more like a reality-and-identity control system.
The patterns matter more than the label
Lifton’s classic study of coercive environments described recurring features of “thought reform,” including control over the information environment, loaded language, moral polarization, and pressures that shape identity and belonging (Lifton, 1961). Lalich later described how high-control systems create “bounded choice,” narrowing perceived alternatives so that loyalty feels like the only safe option, even when it is not formally forced (Lalich, 2004). Political science research on “political sectarianism” similarly shows how moralized us-versus-them thinking can turn normal democratic conflict into something closer to tribal warfare, built from othering, dislike, and moral judgment (Finkel et al., 2020). Cognitive psychology research adds another crucial piece: repetition changes belief. Claims repeated often enough can start to feel true, even when they are false, a phenomenon known as the “illusory truth effect” (Udry & Barber, 2024).
Those frameworks give us a grounded way to examine what many people are experiencing right now: the sense that reality is being bent, that loyalty is being demanded, and that fear is being cultivated. Below are eight patterns, each paired with a documented high-control group example and a MAGA-era example, using primary sources where possible and peer-reviewed research for mechanisms.
Pattern 1: The “Savior” Leader
High-control groups often elevate a single leader as uniquely capable of rescue. When the leader becomes the solution to everything, doubt becomes more than disagreement. It begins to look like betrayal. In Peoples Temple, Jim Jones told his followers, “If you see me as your father, I’ll be your father… If you see me as your God, I’ll be your God” (Jonestown Institute, Q042 Transcript). That is not simply charisma. It is a structural claim that identity and authority should be anchored in the leader rather than in ordinary sources like family, community, or independent moral reasoning.
In the MAGA movement, the savior framing shows up in grandiose claims that position the leader as the irreplaceable force for national salvation. In an address before a joint session of Congress on March 4, 2025, Donald Trump said he could “find a cure to the most devastating disease,” produce “the greatest economy in history,” and bring about “the stoppage of crime to the lowest levels ever recorded” (American Presidency Project, March 4, 2025). The pattern is not that a politician claims competence. It is the scale and structure of the claim: national rescue is personified, and loyalty to the leader becomes tied to the idea of national survival.
Pattern 2: Us vs Them Moralization
A common high-control dynamic is turning disagreement into moral war. Outsiders are not merely wrong. They are framed as dangerous, evil, or illegitimate. Political science describes a related process in contemporary America as political sectarianism, where the opposition is moralized into an out-group and treated as a threat to the nation’s identity and legitimacy (Finkel et al., 2020). This shift is crucial because it can make cruelty and exclusion feel justified, even virtuous, because harm is reframed as protection.
In the Jonestown “Death Tape,” Jones warns that outsiders will “torture some of our children… torture our seniors” (Jonestown Institute, Q042 Transcript). The emotional job of that language is to convert fear into moral permission: if outsiders are coming to harm your children, anything becomes defensible.
A parallel dynamic appears when political leaders frame internal opponents as enemies comparable to foreign adversaries. In remarks to military leaders on September 30, 2025, Trump described an “enemy from within” and framed internal opposition as an “invasion from within,” language that moves political conflict into the territory of domestic enemy combatants (Miller Center, Sept. 30, 2025). When the “them” inside the country becomes an enemy force, democratic coexistence becomes harder to imagine.
Pattern 3: Reality Filtering
High-control systems often teach followers what to trust and what to dismiss as lies before they even engage the evidence. Lifton described “milieu control” as managing the information environment so competing perspectives lose legitimacy (Lifton, 1961). This is not simply “they disagree with the media.” It is training people to treat outside information as inherently contaminated.
Scientology provides a clear example in policy language. Critics can be labeled “Suppressive Persons,” and members may be instructed to “handle” the person or “disconnect” from them (Hubbard, HCO Policy Letter, Dec. 23, 1965). The practical result is fewer outside reality checks and greater dependence on the group for belonging and truth.
In MAGA-world, “fake news” functions as a broad delegitimizing label that trains supporters to dismiss mainstream reporting by default. Research documents how political elites use “fake news” framing strategically across platforms as a way to weaken trust in independent journalism (Farhall et al., 2019; Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2020). Once people are trained to reject outside sources as hostile, contradictory evidence is easier to dismiss without evaluation.
Pattern 4: Thought-Stopping Phrases
High-control groups often rely on simple slogans and compressed language that ends conversation fast. Lifton described “thought-terminating clichés” and loaded language that can shut down questioning by replacing complexity with certainty (Lifton, 1961). The phrase does the thinking for you. It delivers a conclusion without requiring evidence, and it can turn doubt into disloyalty.
In Heaven’s Gate, leaders used group-exclusive terms like “Evolutionary Level Above Human” (Robinson, 1997; Zeller, 2006). The jargon carried belief inside the vocabulary. It was not merely a word choice. It was an entire worldview packaged as a normal-sounding phrase.
“Stop the Steal” operates similarly in political form. The slogan asserts the conclusion as fact, and the chant makes repetition feel like proof. Courts repeatedly rejected fraud claims for lack of evidence, including in a major Third Circuit decision in 2020 (Trump for President v. Secretary of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3d Cir., Nov. 27, 2020). Yet the slogan persisted as a loyalty marker and identity statement, documented as a central mobilizing frame in the January 6 investigation record (Select Committee Final Report, 2022). The pattern is the same: a slogan compresses a false claim into something you are supposed to repeat, not evaluate.
Pattern 5: Repetition Makes Claims Feel True
Even when people think they are too rational to be influenced by repetition, repetition still works. The illusory truth effect is one of the more unsettling findings in cognitive psychology: repeated statements feel more accurate than unfamiliar ones, even when they are false (Udry & Barber, 2024). This is one reason high-control systems repeat the same story, the same labels, and the same villains until it feels like common sense.
A non-“all religions do this” example needs more specificity than “they repeat teachings.” The Branch Davidians provide that specificity because repetition was fused with exclusive interpretive authority. Koresh repeatedly taught that he alone could reveal the meaning of Revelation’s “Seven Seals,” positioning himself as uniquely qualified to decode reality (Reader, 2000). Repetition plus exclusivity can turn one interpretation into the only imaginable truth.
In the MAGA-era, repetition often shows up in the way false claims and labels can override direct evidence. A recent example was the public framing around Alex Pretti, where official claims about “brandishing” were repeated as a defining label even as released video evidence fueled competing interpretations of what occurred (Reuters, January 2026; AP, January 2026). The key point is not one incident. It is the mechanism: repeated labels, especially when echoed by authority and media loops, can stick even when viewers have seen the footage.
Pattern 6: Conspiracy and Persecution Narratives
High-control systems frequently claim hidden enemies control the system and that “we” are under attack. This creates siege thinking: distrust becomes a duty, and extreme actions begin to feel necessary. Aum Shinrikyo used apocalyptic conspiracy frameworks in which powerful outside forces were part of a catastrophic end-times struggle (Reader, 2000). In that worldview, the group is always the victim and always justified.
Research has shown a relationship between conspiracy beliefs and support for political violence, which makes persecution narratives more than just rhetoric. They can change what people see as justified action (Enders et al., HKS Misinformation Review). When institutions are framed as illegitimate by definition, accountability becomes persecution, and violence becomes “self-defense.”
In MAGA messaging, persecution narratives appear in the framing of investigations and prosecutions as “deep state” operations and in the rhetorical recasting of January 6 defendants as victims rather than perpetrators (Select Committee Final Report, 2022). The pattern is consistent: if the system is run by hidden enemies, then refusing to accept the system becomes moral virtue.
Pattern 7: Loyalty Tests, Shame, and Punishment
High-control movements do not only persuade. They enforce. Loyalty becomes visible. You have to perform agreement, and dissent has a cost. NXIVM is a stark example: members in a secret subgroup were required to provide “collateral,” including damaging material that could be used against them, creating coercive pressure to comply (United States v. Raniere, 2d Cir., 2022). The function is straightforward: fear of punishment keeps people obedient.
In MAGA-world, loyalty enforcement often shows up as public shaming and social punishment, especially when dissent becomes visible. In late 2025, Trump publicly labeled Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene a “traitor” after she criticized him (TIME, Nov. 2025; ABC News, 2025). The effect is not limited to the target. Public humiliation signals to everyone else what happens when you break ranks. That is how high-control systems reduce dissent without needing formal rules.
Pattern 8: Legitimation of Aggression
The final pattern is what makes everything above more dangerous. Harm gets reframed as necessary, righteous, or self-defense. Violence becomes not a choice but an obligation. Manson’s “Helter Skelter” narrative framed violence as meaningful preparation for a coming race war and as part of a destiny the group believed it could trigger or survive (Bugliosi & Gentry, 1974; later scholarly analyses of apocalyptic framing and violent legitimation). The story sanctified harm.
On January 6, 2021, Trump told supporters, “We fight like hell, and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore,” and urged a march to the Capitol in the same speech event record (C-SPAN Ellipse Rally Record, Jan. 6, 2021; Select Committee Final Report, 2022). The significance of that language is not that political leaders use metaphors. It is that existential framing, coupled with moral enemy narratives and loyalty pressure, lowers the threshold for real-world aggression. When the crowd believes the nation is being stolen and the enemy is within, “fight” stops sounding like metaphor to at least some listeners.
What this lens is for
This lens is not about name-calling. It is about harm reduction. High-control systems do not collapse because of one perfect argument. They crack when people recognize the patterns and stop cooperating with them. Pattern recognition helps people protect their reality, resist slogan traps, avoid repeating lies, and set boundaries around abusive dynamics. It also helps people understand why “just show them the facts” often fails when the facts are filtered through a loyalty system.
If you are watching this and feeling shaken, that is not a personal failure. That is what high-control dynamics do. They make people doubt their eyes, distrust neutral sources, and treat simple slogans like moral truth. The more people can name what is happening, the less power it has. Information, in systems built on fear and repetition, is not neutral. It is disruptive.
References
American Presidency Project. (March 4, 2025). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Donald J. Trump). University of California, Santa Barbara.
Barker, E. (2013). “The Cult as a Social Problem.” In The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements. Cambridge University Press.
Bugliosi, V., & Gentry, C. (1974). Helter Skelter. W.W. Norton.
Egelhofer, J. L., & Lecheler, S. (2020). “From Novelty to Normalization? How Journalists Use the Term ‘Fake News’ in Their Reporting.” Journalism Studies, 21(10), 1323–1343.
Enders, A. M., et al. (2022). “The Relationship Between Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Political Violence.” Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review.
Farhall, K., Carson, A., Wright, S., Gibbons, A., & Lukamto, W. (2019). “Political Elites’ Use of Fake News Discourse Across Communications Platforms.” International Journal of Communication, 13, 4353–4375.
Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., & Rand, D. G. (2020). “Political Sectarianism in America.” Science, 370(6516), 533–536.
Hubbard, L. R. (1965). HCO Policy Letter: PTS Type A Handling (December 23, 1965; reissued).
Jonestown Institute. Q042 “Death Tape” transcript and related archival transcripts.
Lalich, J. (2004). Bounded Choice: True Believers and Charismatic Cults. University of California Press.
Lifton, R. J. (1961). Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism. W.W. Norton.
Miller Center, University of Virginia. (September 30, 2025). Remarks to Military Leaders (Donald J. Trump).
Reader, I. (2000). Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyō. University of Hawai‘i Press.
Robinson, W. G. (1997). “Heaven’s Gate: The End.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 3(3).
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. (December 2022). Final Report.
Trump for President, Inc. v. Secretary of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 20-3371 (3d Cir. Nov. 27, 2020).
United States v. Raniere, No. 20-3520 (2d Cir. 2022).
Udry, J., & Barber, S. J. (2024). “The Illusory Truth Effect: A Review of Explanations and Implications.” Current Opinion in Psychology, 56, 101736.
Reuters. (January 2026). Reporting on the Alex Pretti incident and subsequent review narrative.
Associated Press. (January 2026). Reporting on the Alex Pretti incident and released video context.